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The sound of the perpetrator – thoughts on trauma and voice in Big Little Lies
Abstract
Sound is as much part of the atmospheres of justice as is touch or image or even smell. Sound gets into
the body and it leaves a mark. Sometimes that mark can be called violence, sometimes harm, and
sometimes a crime. In this article I discuss how sound, as voice as well as the other nebulous sonic
elements, such as grunts, shuffles and sighs, can leave a mark that can be called trauma. Using
psychoanalysis I discuss theories of trauma as they intersect with experiences of sound in the courtroom
as well as in fictional narratives. I examine the mark of trauma, as an experience of rape, as it appeared in
the series Big Little Lies and I discuss how it can appear in the courtroom using psychoanalysis and the
work of thinkers on sexual assault, on voice and on sound. I conclude that sound cannot not be part of
the thinking on justice for victim-survivors of sexual assault, as well as of other interpersonal crimes.
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The sound of the perpetrator – thoughts
on trauma and voice in Big Little Lies.
Juliet Rogers
When sound enters the body it is never without impact. We might call
this impact damage, harm, resonance, recognition or perhaps listening.
These are all of the same family here. Sound provokes the body’s
response. The body contorts around the sound. Sonic fragments are
arranged, ordered, made sense of. Some let in, others guarded against.
Sound is felt physiologically and psychologically. That is, it is felt in
the flesh. Where the particles of sound enter the body and cannot be
placed, where they cannot allow the flesh to wrap around, to order, to
arrange or assimilate the meaning of the sound – either as symbol or as
sensation – then there is trauma.
As James Parker (2018) has illustrated in his discussion of the
Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), sound can be a weapon that
traumatises the flesh. It can do damage at the level of physiognomy
in a form that can be called harm. The destruction of hearing, the
destruction of life, can be the result of sound. In the forms he analyses,
the weapons are designed to impact as destruction or, not mutually
exclusively, as control. In these forms sound as a weapon leaves a mark
on and inside the body, sometimes a lethal one. The limits of its entry
are not easily policed or prevented against. And this entry can disturb
and distort us at fundamental levels. Sound permeates flesh and it can
permeate identity; sound can change us. When it does, it permeates
the parameters or outlines that give the body its imaginary limits; those
Law Text Culture Vol 24 2020 00
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that are neither real nor unreal but exist as the perceptions of where we
begin and end, of which skin is only one border. When sound permeates
our perceived limits it can fragment identity and when that identity
is permeated by sound at the same time that the body is damaged or
injured by another, then the effects can be devastating.

Here I want to discuss how sound, as voice – the not quite not
language theorised by Mladen Dolar (2006) – and as the other nebulous
sonic elements, such as grunts, shuffles and sighs, can leave a mark in
and on the body; a mark that can be called trauma. To understand this
mark I will analyse how the specificities of sound, particularly when it
appears through or as the voice of perpetrators of interpersonal violence,
can impact on the body of people often called victim/survivors and
how it can produce a traumatic effect. This effect, I suggest, can be
ameliorated, sometimes, by a space for testimony in the juridical world,
but not always. And that space must be specific and enable the story
to be transmitted, in the terms of psychoanalyst Dori Laub (1992: 69).
Transmission, as I will explain, is no simple exchange, but involves the
legal conditions of receipt as well as the sonic space for hearing. Again,
no simple thing, but a crucial focus if we are to think about justice in
more than its presence as words and images, that is, if we are to think
about justice in all its dimensions.

To elaborate these layered concerns with sound and voice I discuss
a few sonic moments, scenes or events (it is hard to categorise these
when sound leaks across temporality) in the celebrated series Big
Little Lies, in which people we can call victims and perpetrators speak
and do not. Through analysing these moments, with the assistance of
psychoanalytic work on trauma and identity, I want to consider how the
sound of the perpetrator of interpersonal violence might be understood
not quite as a weapon but as a vehicle of trauma within the political
and legal structures which enable trauma to be experienced as such.
I am not convinced of this effect, nor do I believe it can be applied
universally, instead I will compose a conversational note on trauma,
sound and legal identity in the hope that it adds to the thinking in
the relatively new field of law and sound being largely illuminated by
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Nasser Hussein (2013), Sara Ramshaw (2013) and James Parker (2015).

My expertise is not in the area of sound, but in the area of trauma. In
my previous role as a trauma therapist, however, I heard a lot – perhaps
too much – on how sound was used in interpersonal violence, and, if
we are to consider justice, in one light, as the practice of a response
to trauma and violence, then we cannot not think on the possible
violences of sound and voice. Just as we cannot not encounter law in
all geographical spaces, as Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has
remarked (2018: 4). I would suggest, in parallel agreement with Parker,
that we cannot not encounter law in all sonic spaces (2015: 205).

In part one I explore a scene from Big Little Lies, what I am
calling a scene of recognition of the perpetrator of rape for one of the
characters. This scene is populated, as I discuss, with images, language
and/as sound. The voice of the perpetrator, its rhythms as much as
the grammar used, return the memory of the assailant back to the
victim/survivor. I then discuss how the body’s permeation by sound
can be felt traumatically precisely because of the attachment of that
body to an identity that cannot or will not be permeated. Sound, as
I discuss, functions alongside the rape, as a kind of metaphor, but it
relies on particular attachments to the limits of the body as an outline
of identity, a legal identity, populated by its fantasies of autonomy and
agency. This outline, as I consider in part two, is defended against to
more or less degrees. Sound, like language, and the recognition of
the presence of others as such, must get in. Sound, in psychoanalysis,
permeates identity insofar as its very existence demands recognition
of the otherness of others. As such, sound, as I discuss in part three, is
a metonym for trauma itself, insofar as it is always a rupture. In part
four I discuss how this rupture can be exacerbated in the courtroom,
and how law can influence the experience of such a rupture. Law, I
suggest, can speak to sound, and in so doing, potentially put sound in
its place, putting the perpetrator back in the place of legally subject
and thus reassure and re-assert the limits of the traumatised body of
the victim/survivor.
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Part I – the sound of recognition
In the first series of Big Little Lies viewers come to understand that the
character, Jane, has been raped and violently assaulted. The knowledge
of this assault is unfolded slowly in the series. The audience and her
friends discover, through scenic overlays of Jane’s memories, that
the rape was brutal, that the effects are enduring: hypervigilance,
nightmares, flashbacks, as well as the conception of her son, Ziggy. We
learn that the perpetrator was not known to her, but for a conversation
in a bar before the assault; that she cannot recall his name, his face or
his voice, until (spoiler alert) the end of the series in which she realises
he is the husband of one of her friends. This recognition is played out in
the final moments of the last episode of Season One, when she stands
in the group of her friends, while Jane’s friend Celeste is being harassed
by her husband: Perry. Jane looks at Perry while he is demanding of
Celeste that she leave the function with him. After a few moments
Jane realises that Perry is the man who raped her years earlier.
This is the classic cinematic scene of recognition. It unfolds in
a well-rehearsed portrayal of traumatic memory. Images flash. The
side of his face before her, interspersed with the memory of his face
as he left the room and closed the door after raping her. The scene of
recognition and realisation is, on first glance, populated by images.
But this realisation is marred in sound as well as silence, as we will
see/hear/read. This scene opens when Perry is confronting Celeste at
a school function after he has discovered she is leaving him.
Perry: Celeste can I talk to you for a minute?
Celeste: No
Perry: Please Celeste can I talk to you?
Celeste: No [shakes her head]
Perry: Let’s go back to the car.
Celeste: I’m not coming back with you.
Perry: Celeste?
Celeste: No
Renata [one of the friends]: I think she just needs a minute.
Perry: I appreciate your concern but I’m talking to my wife not you.
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Celeste, let’s just go now. We have to talk about it.
Celeste: [shouts] NO! I’m not coming home with you, so just don’t do this
in front of everyone do you understand. I’m not….

And the voice fades while Jane slides into what is commonly referred
to in trauma literature as a ‘flashback’1 of the man leaving the room
after raping her; then running on the beach, which is repopulated by a
revenge fantasy that has been emerging in particles across the episodes.
Running, trying to catch up to the faceless man (or catch up to the
memory). For the first time, in this scene she reaches him. Finally. He
turns. She sees his face and it is Perry, Celeste’s violent husband. In
this repopulated memory Jane points a gun. This pointing, with the
additional sound of a gunshot, is then re-produced or re-fantasised in
the immediate moment while she is with the group of women at the
function. It is layered and complex, in images and in sound. Bear with
me.
Immediately, we might read this scene as the portrayal of a visual
memory. Jane sees Perry’s face while he’s addressing Celeste, just on an
angle, and she remembers him leaving the room where he raped her. It
is as if the memory of the face provokes the remembering. And perhaps
this is partially true. But, the scene progresses, Perry’s voice persists, in
spite of Celeste’s repeated ‘No’. This is the refusal; the limit not heard
and respected. It is also a sonic event and a sonic metaphor for the rape;
one played out in sound and silence. And we can understand the above
exchange as one layer of a scene populated by images, language, voice
and background music. But it is more than its linguistic, vocal or even
musical presence. It is also punctuated by the rhythms of sound; of the
silence between the voice and between the address and response. I’ll
unpack these elements in what follows.

The exchange between Celeste and Perry is framed in terms of his
demand and her refusal, followed by his demand which ignores the ‘No’
and continues, almost without registering her refusal. His persistent
overriding of her wishes is, most obviously, a metaphor for sexual
assault. But not only. It is also, as I will explain, a metaphor for an
enforced fragmentation of identity; these fragments being metonymized
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in the in-between silences. These are the silences in which the response
of Celeste is not heard but forms only a pivot to the next relation-less
demand perpetrated as the refusal to recognise the simple presence of
another; the refusal to hear the ‘no’ and walk away.
Examining the exchange above, applying Alison Young’s insights on
the language used in rape trials, we can understand that the exchange
as not only the performance of language, but a relation to sound as well
as to silence. In Young’s analysis of one woman being cross-examined
by the defence:
Her negative reply never halts the defence narrative; the questioner
never concedes that any element of the counter-narrative has been
displaced. Questions follow on as if the victim had agreed with the
questioner, as if her “no” was a ‘yes’ (1998: 463).

The effect of this is an obvious annihilation of agency in the gaze
of the jury. It is what we might think of as the classically misogynist
re-symbolisation of women’s desire represented as confused: ‘No
means yes’. Woman is represented in this exchange as not to be trusted
in knowing her own desire and certainly not to be trusted in her
duplicitous representation of it to a man. This is where notions of what
has come to be called ‘re-traumatisation’ in trials can be readily applied;
where the woman’s narrative – that any lack of active consent means
‘no’ - is not only negated but emptied of any status as authoritative or
indeed as valid (Orth et al 2004, Rogers 2010).2 But the effect is also
an insertion of voice into the body.
On the one hand the woman in Young’s account hears the words,
but, like the character, Celeste, these words are not halted by her
refusal of the narrative. There is no effect of the refusal. The demands
continue, the questions persist without acknowledging the response.
Just as Jane has initially resisted Perry’s assault, only surrendering
when, as she describes, ‘[she] thought he was going to kill [her]’, the
questions from the defence, are, in Young’s idiom, a metonym for the
assault. The woman’s body is rendered permeable by the persistence of
the questions, unchecked and unaltered by her refusal.
The only indication that a woman’s ‘no’ had an impact in Big Little
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Lies - and commonly in systemic violence toward women by partners
and ex-partners (Alaattinoğlu et al 2018) – is the rage of the husband
at his own inability to have an impact with his words. He then applies
other parts of his physiognomy in the well-worn and well-documented
modality of violent husbands (ibid). He rushes toward her, landing
blows, knocking her to the ground, then repeatedly kicking her while
she is cowering. Celeste’s body, we see later when she is speaking to
police, is torn, bloody and bruised from his efforts. Impact achieved.
Body permeated.
In the exchange above Perry’s ignoring of Celeste’s ‘No’ is not only
indicated by his refusal not to engage with or adhere to her wishes, it is
present in the silences which punctuate the time since she speaks and the
time before he does. In these silences there is an extra-subjective space
in which the delay indicates a shift in grammatical relation. Her ‘no’ is
a direct and relational engagement with his request – the fact that he
does not like it is irrelevant. His repeated demands, without registering
the ‘no’, are precisely an erasure of a response at all. In exercising this
erasure silence is rendered the dominant response, and an element in
the violent rhythms of the assault that Jane remembers. Evident in the
first few sentences of the exchange:
Perry: Celeste can I talk to you for a minute?
Celeste: No
Perry: Please Celeste can I talk to you?
Celeste: No...

The demand – to say it is a question would be disingenuous – and the
response: ‘No’, operate between the effective silence as silencing. That
is, the repetition of the demand appears as if the ‘No’ was a silence. And
then, of course, there is the silence that exists between the repetition,
producing the exchange as a rhythmic beat.
Repetition in this exchange operates like a melody, and not a sweet
one. As Laub notes in the context of the speech of victim/survivors
testifying to their experiences. ‘It seems to me that in addition to what
is manifestly said, associated to, dreamt about and elaborated, there is
another, a more subtle melody’ (1992: 63). It is this melody, the staccato
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rhythm of Perry’s repetitive demands that Jane hears, or rather it is the
space between the sound (between the notes) that she populates with
recognition. It is not simply the voice that she hears which reminds
her of the assailant, but the rhythm; one which resembles the body
blows of Perry’s assault, and the irrelevance of her own refusal in the
experience of being raped.

Perry’s speech pattern here is certainly a metaphor for the rape itself,
but his sonic rhythms enhance this effect. Shown briefly in several of
Jane’s flashbacks where she describes him as being like a ‘machine’,
and we are shown the brutal rhythm of his assault on her. Repetitive,
mechanical, furious. The repetition is thus melody as metaphor playedout on her body at the time and replayed in her flesh – through the
experience of hearing – at the moment of recognition. In this sense it is
the sound of Perry’s voice, his silence and his non-relational demands, as
much as it might be the visual recognition of his face, which provokes
her memory.
Part II – skin, rights and identity.
The impact of Perry’s blows on Celeste’s body after her ‘No’ has failed
is doubled in its representation in the show when she is later shown
speaking to the police, and, although we see that she is bloody and
bruised, the exchange is muted. The other women from this group are
also then shown in similar interviews with police, also muted. Music,
as part of the celebrated soundtrack of this series, is played over them.
Their mouths move, their hands gesture, their eyes engage, flicker and
close, their bodies flinch as they recount a version of what occurred.
But we don’t hear their voices for some time. One could read this as an
astute representation of the muting of women’s narratives in both sexual
assault and domestic violence, the two dominant narrative threads of
this series. However, I want to focus here on these moving mouths and
the object called voice which falls from the mouth, understanding the
mouth as a cut in the body in Lacanian terms.
The mouth, for Jacques Lacan, is a cut from which an intangible,
unrepresentable object falls: voice (2006: 693). Whereas the ear is the
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inverted cut which sound falls into. And the body is then the bricolage
of what Jacques-Alain Miller (2004) refers to as ‘spare parts’, skin and
rights being the limits, which hold the image of the body – both felt
and fantasised – together as identity. Let us begin with the mouth. As
Young has illuminated:
Much has been written about the mouth as a projectile device. 3 It is
from the mouth that insults can issue, it is from the mouth that hate
speech is uttered, it is from the mouth that accusations of rape can
be made. Our fascination with the speaking mouth derives from its
constitution as a border between the inner self and the outer other. The
mouth opens, the tongue moves, the voice sounds, words are uttered.
Ingestion operates in reverse: the mouth opens, a thing is inserted,
the tongue moves, the throat closes. The outer other is incorporated
into the interior self (1998: 454).

The mouth here is articulated as a ‘border’, but one that is only
policed by its closure, and only effective if this closure is not breached.
The border denotes a level of autonomy, - we could call it sovereignty,
when permission for entry or exit is the purview, entirely, of the subject
- over that which exists within its boundaries: the body.4 The body, is,
however, not without its imaginary limits; limits which entwine legal
subjectivity, social and political representations of a body’s teleology as
well as – and never mutually exclusively - physiological perceptions of
where flesh begins and ends. Beginnings and endings which engage,
adjust or disintegrate when their limits are permeated. This is as true of
the mouth, and ingestion, as it is of the ear and hearing. To understand
the mouth’s role in speech, as well as to understand the ear’s role in
sonic-relations, we need to elaborate politico-legal perceptions of an
identification with the body’s imaginary limits and their relation to skin.

Permeation of the politico-legal outline of a woman’s body in
particular are helpfully articulated in Jacqueline Rose’s (2016) account
of a male colleague repeatedly ignoring her refusal of more wine at a
collegial dinner. Filling her glass, despite her ‘no’ – even when she
placed her hand over the top of the glass – he pours the wine over her
hand. It trickles into the glass from between her closed fingers. This
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is not a scene of sexual assault, but, as a metaphor for such an act it is
not not such a scene. The experience being, in every sense, subjective.
What we can say is that it is certainly invasive, if not violent; it is,
simply, ignorant of the presence of another. These are the phrases and
words we use for this kind of act. And, in experiences like Rose’s, the
wine – like sound, as Parker has noted – changes the feel of her skin, of
her hand, and perhaps it changes her belief in her capacity to authorise
a ‘no’. Rose’s actions, we can say, are at least partially choreographed
around this man’s behaviours. Her relationship to her own authority, to
others, and perhaps to wine is compromised, and maybe altered in the
future. This is both the affective relations that law cannot comprehend,
in Peter Goodrich’s (1998) terms, but it is also damage, at one level,
because, if we are to believe Lacan, trauma is always a trauma to identity.
Identity is the belief, in Lacan’s terms, in the ‘I, I take myself to
be’, and that ‘I’ is intimately attached to the legal constitution and the
contours of its body; an I who can decide, who can refuse, and who can
influence the behaviour of another. An autonomous I. An I who can
act in the capacity of, what psychoanalyst Jamieson Webster describes
as the ‘lionized individual’(2019: 7). Lionised by parents as much as
by law and the political emphases of the western world and through,
as Gayatri Spivak astutely notes the ‘isolationist admiration’ of the
western individual that promises isolation as agency and, indeed, as
the freedom to exercise privacy and freedom from the state (1999: 114).
The contours of such an individual reside in the symbols with which
one constitutes or cloaks oneself. In this sense, skin and rights bear the
same insignia, not only as the parameters of what we’ve come to call
privacy, but as the outline of an identity that is substantiated through
its capacity to exercise desire, and indeed refusal. Speech – the ‘no’ in
this case – is an articulation of an identification as such an individual, but
hearing is the involuntary compromise of such parameters, and sound
is the vehicle which lacerates the integrity of its contours.
Identity, in its symbolic and substantive contours, is tied intrinsically
to not only law’s production of the outline of the legal subject, but
to the image of oneself as a lived body, as flesh. The body that feels,
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speaks, hears and refuses. Identity, in psychoanalysis, is linked to the
imaginary limits of the body, insofar as the body can repel, guard
against or permit the invasions – weather or touch – from the external
world. In the sense of touch, including the touch of the state, identity is
linked to the perceived limits of transgression by others, including the
state.5 Both these registers of identity are not fixed and need to wrangle
with the question of their permeability. How much can a person or an
element enter the body, including how much sound?

Sound, when it appears as voice, demands the industry of ordering
and promotes what we call desire, as the desire to make the sound
representable. This is in part because voice falls from the mouth as an
object which cannot be represented. It is, as Lacan says, ‘non-specular’.
Like the gaze that falls from the eyes,6 voice falls from the mouth. But
the mouth is also a cut in the body, which gives voice a dual significance.
Voice, as it falls from the mouth of others, offers the promise of
returning the body to itself as whole, to heal the cut, as it were. This is
a discussion of the dynamic of castration (the cut) in psychoanalysis,
but we need not dwell on the technicalities of psychoanalysis, suffice to
say that the knowledge of the cut – as a severance of something from
the whole body – heralds the entrance of the subject into a world with
others, into the world of language, the symbolic world. This entrance
into the symbolic world is when sounds come to be framed into sense,
as opposed to nonsense. Although the non-sense quality will always
endure as a mark of that which cannot be understood, comprehended
or mastered.7 In Lacan’s terms language ‘holds out …the tired allure
of the shadow as if it were substance’, as if the shadow of a sound, as
speech of gesture, or of a meaning, the alternative interpretations of a
sound, can all be known at once (2006: 693). In short, as if there were
no question of our understandings of ourselves and of others.

But sound is not a substance, and as such it heralds unknowability,
and at the same time the recognition, at some level, that there is always
a shadow to representation; a world outside the mastery of the self. That
is, voice, in its shadowy form, is a metonym for the unknowable parts of
the other person and, indeed, of the unknowable parts of the symbolic
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world. As such, voice exists always with the potential to indicate the
subject as being barred from anything like what we might call full
comprehension of others and of oneself, and this lack of comprehension is
a parallel experience with trauma.
Part III – the trauma of sound
The understanding of voice as an object which pronounces
unknowability, or as a metonym for incomprehension, means that
voice, as it enters the body that hears, always undermines the belief
that the subject has its own autonomy. This is both the best and worst
effects of voice; it demands hearing and as such it demands encounter
of a non-narcissistic type.8 It demands, as I’ve noted, that the body
wrap around the phoneme and make sense. But it is also this industry
that is the most disturbing and potentially the instigator of a traumatic
effect for victim/survivors encountering perpetrators in the courtroom.
The awareness of the impossibility of comprehension is, in one sense,
a kind of original trauma. With the stakes, as Lacan describes of the
‘Copernican revolution’ in which the realisation, that the Earth spun,
and was not simply spun around, by the sun, is a terrifying realization
that we are not all (Lacan, 2006: 429). As Jill Stauffer describes
‘Self-formation is like a trauma striking against a self that would be
autonomous’ precisely because of the existence of others as others
(2015: 24). When our identities are further fractured by the brutality
of being unable to control our surroundings or our bodies – such as in
experiences of rape, but not only – then this can produce a trauma to
the ‘I, I take myself to be’. I want to now speculate on how trauma is
articulated and how this effect is potentially enhanced by the sound of
the perpetrator in the courtroom, and not only the sight of him (and
occasionally her or they).
It is the non-specular quality of voice– the presence of it as
unrepresentable – when it is present as the voice of another (any
other), that brings us alongside theories of trauma (Lacan 2006: 693).
This is because the quality of the voice as non-representable, both
promotes a certain libidinal investment (it promotes a desire to order,
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to understand or to master) and gestures to the impossibility of mastery
or of comprehension through analogy or association. The voice, as
unable to be symbolized, endows it with a quality which parallels the
experience of trauma where an experience is unassimilable.9 As Laub
says of trauma:
The traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters
of “normal” reality, such as causality, sequence, place and time. The
trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before,
no during and no after. This absence of categories that define it lends
it a quality of “otherness,” a salience a timelessness and a ubiquity that
puts it outside the range of associatively linked experiences, outside
the range of comprehension, of recounting and of mastery (1992: 69).

The event experienced as ‘outside the range of associatively linked
experiences’ is what renders it ‘unassimilable’. The rendition of the event
as ‘unassimilable’, in Cathy Caruth’s terms (1996:4), (or as ‘having a
quality of otherness’ in Laub’s terms above), does not mean that it has
not happened before. It means that the symbolic attachments to the
experience of the event are what we can describe as unrecognisable
and thus unassimilable into the prior world of the survivor. In the
experience of rape, similar to that of torture – as recounted in the
renowned work of Elaine Scarry (1985) – objects, including one’s own
body, are re-signified by the perpetrator (by the ‘regime’, in Scarry’s
terms); a smile becomes an invitation, a kiss is permission into the rest
of the body, and the body itself – in any form of response that does not
articulate with the ‘I, I take myself to be’ – is its own weapon against
the victim/survivor.
Hearing is one response which bears this potential also. Hearing
can be an exquisite experience, such as the hearing of music, of the
wind, the rain on a roof, of the breath of a lover. But hearing, as it
provokes memory, including memories of pain, loss or violence, can
turn one’s own body into a weapon against itself. In one of the many
notable examples of this in the celebrated and much awarded series
of West Wing the character Josh, having been shot and left for some
time bleeding on a footpath while ambulances arrived, later attends a
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concert and hears Yo-Yo Ma playing Bach. He recounts the experience
to his therapist.
Josh: It was the Bach. G Major.
Therapist: It’s a nice piece
Josh: It is.
Therapist: Did he play it well?
Josh: It was Yo-Yo Ma!

But Josh’s body turns the sounds of Yo-Yo Ma’s cello performance
of Bach into the memory of ambulance sirens, and he relives the trauma
of being shot, or specifically of being left bleeding on the sidewalk
hearing the sirens in the distance, perhaps arriving in time, perhaps
not; ‘an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, no during
and no after’ (Laub 1992: 69). The sound – the beautiful sounds of a
cello suite – turned into pain, terror, and an experience of near-death.
Involuntarily. Sounds which resonate with prior experiences, sometimes
in unpredictable ways – where the sound of a cello becomes a siren.
And sometimes in predictable ways, when the perpetrator’s voice in
the courtroom, resembles the voice heard at the time of the assault –
can contort the subject in this way and when it is the hearing of the
voice or sounds of a perpetrator, I suggest, that this can compound an
experience of trauma.

The experience of Perry’s voice and his silence in the exchange
with Celeste, can be understood to function in this way for Jane. To
understand this function it is important to understand trauma not as
an event, but as a response to an event. That is, an event which may
be traumatic, in Laub’s terms, is one that produces the symptoms of
trauma as a result of an unassimilable experience. These symptoms are
usually categorised as hypervigilance, flashbacks, nightmares, a focus
on the past, heightened emotional responses to stimuli.10 Jane, in the
series, expresses all these. And, in the moment that she hears Perry
making demands of Celeste, and ignoring her refusal, these symptoms
are heightened, as I discussed above. What I want to explain here is
that, understood through trauma theory, this response can be enhanced
when there is a legally permitted presence of the sound, as much as to
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the presence of the exchange, the rhythm – as I noted above – and the
language used.

Recalling Young’s careful analysis of cross examination – the
production of a ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘yes’ from the mouth of the victim – we can
understand that language in its appearance as a speech act – does its own
damage. The speech in the courtroom when it is presented by legal
officials, speaks an authority that can readily delegitimate the reality of
the victim. It is in this sense that such experiences of cross examination
– as noted by Young – can retraumatise the victim/survivor, returning
her to the world of ‘otherness’ that was her experience of her own body,
her own sense of herself, during the assault. But voice, as it acts beyond
language, has another force. It can be experienced like a weapon,
precisely because it undermines the promise of complete signification,
or what I have explained as comprehension of the self; a confident belief in
the ‘I, I take myself to be’. I want to suggest that something of the sonic
presence of the perpetrator is potentially traumatic as a/the rupture to
the identity of the victim because its presence, in sound (irrespective
of language) inserts itself, unchecked, into the body of the victim, like
a siren, but also, because law supports this rupture anew.

The sonic presence of the perpetrator in the courtroom can appear in
a number of forms; when he speaks, shuffles, grunts, or even sits silently.
As well as his visual presence, the sonic presence can be experienced
as evocative of pain, of anger, or of loss. As Jane notes in episode four
of Big Little Lies, when she is presented with a photographic image of
a man (a different man) whose name resembles the false name Perry
gave her on the night of the assault:
Jane: Yeah, I think its him.
If I heard his voice…
I can still remember his voice. I can also remember that disgusting
smell.

Here Jane’s senses intertwine to produce the possibility of memory,
and in this industry of recognition her body wraps around the sensory
elements in an effort to achieve comprehension. This industry is as
much conscious as it is involuntary. The sound, like the smell, gets in.
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The body may repel these visceral reminders out of disgust or despair,
but they permeate the survivor without relief. In the courtroom, this
is unavoidable.11 The victim/survivor can avert her eyes – perhaps close
them or otherwise try and avoid the image of the perpetrator – but
sound, like smell, is more difficult and largely impossible to close upon.

Sound demands attention and for trauma survivors the industry
of comprehension is enhanced in a desperation to heal the experience
of the unassimilable. Dwelling here for a moment on this industry in
psychoanalytic terms we can adapt Young’s discussion of the border
as it applies to the ear, itself a ‘border’. It is like the mouth, but for a
significant distinction; the border of the ear cannot be easily policed
or closed and, short of applying the variety of technologies that have
come to protect ears from industrial sound or enable noise cancelling
for other modes of relaxation, the ear is rendered unguarded, open,
permeable. That is, the ear betrays the subject’s capacity for autonomy
over the intrusion or experience of sound because the very industry of
comprehension is involuntary, like the pain induced by stress positions
in torture, the body acts like its own pharmakon; promoting pain in
the interest of trying to restore itself, but at the same time responding
to the demands of the sound/noise/stress.

The lack of capacity for autonomy over the body’s experience of
sound is not only centred on the ear, of course. As Parker points out, for
people who have degrees of deafness the body still experiences sound
as vibration, ‘Whatever damage a person may sustain to their cochlear
nerve or organ of Corti, sound is experienced by the entire body’ (2015:
203). Sound is not halted because one does not hear. Sound also does
not obey the limits of skin – or of rights – and, as such, its evocative
presence can resemble the traumatic rupture of the assault itself. The
very incapacity to control the borders of the body can feel reminiscent
of the invasive experience because sound is not impacted by the ‘no’. As
such the hearing body of the victim can be forced, in the courtroom,
into a state of recognition, not simply remembering but reliving the
experience of the assault.

It is in this forced reliving that the experience of the voice of the
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perpetrator can resemble the experience of the assault, enhanced by
law’s work to recreate the event, right there, in the courtroom, for the
purposes of judgement, if not justice. This recreation in the courtroom
is, in an obvious sense, counter to psychoanalytic thoughts on what
is conducive to experiences of repair or what has come to be called
healing for victim/survivors of trauma, but not simply because of the
hearing but because of an environment which condones this hearing.
As Laub says:
[for healing to occur] a therapeutic process…of re-externalising the event
– has to be set in motion. This…can occur and take effect only when
one can articulate and transmit the story, literally transfer it to another
outside oneself and then take it back again, inside. Telling thus entails
a reassertion of the hegemony of reality … (my empahsis 1992: 69)

Re-externalising the event requires a presentation, and often as a
speech act, of the event in the present community. It is not any present
community, however, but one in which the story can be transmitted,
and this is a concern with the conditions for transmission, or simply put
it is a concern with the hegemonic reality of the courtroom.

A ‘reassertion of the hegemony of reality’ for the trauma survivor
who enters the courtroom and must hear the sounds of the perpetrator,
requires that the law act to change the rhythms of the perpetrator’s
sounds. On the one hand this would be to punctuate, to rupture, to
silence the perpetrator, to show that he and sometimes she and or
they, is subject to sonic parameters that do not allow his vocal presence
unchecked; that he must hear the ‘no’. This is not simply a paternalizing
of the law such that it takes on the limits of the woman’s body and
protects (although it is not not that), it is the returning of the perpetrator
to the realm of reality.
Perpetrators who are experienced as being able to act with impunity
during acts of violence, to act without regard for the physiological or
legal limits of the body, are more than simply what we call violent or
even criminals, they are the monsters of childhood fantasy. It is why
survivors of extreme acts of violence, at the hands of other humans,
experience breaks or permutations of reality, such as hallucinations.
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This is the work of trauma when it produces a feeling of otherness, a
realisation that an event can have, in Laub’s terms, ‘no beginning, no
ending, no before, no during and no after’(1992:69), like a dream or
indeed a fantasy. This is the stuff of limitless imagination where childish
realities (Freud 1919) – of being subject to the whims of adults to the
point of life and death – having been put in the place of fantasy in
adulthood, then return to the realm of reality. ‘I thought he was going
to kill me’, is to experience an event without end at the hands of an
omnipotent perpetrator.

In the series Big Little Lies there is an end to the event. The
perpetrator dies. But the second series is organised around the law’s
response to the event. A question of judgment. A question of justice.
Framed in the immortality of Perry – his mother before, his children
after. What is left of Perry, such that he retains the omnipotence of a
perpetrator without limits, is embodied in the law. And it becomes the
question as the not so subtle melody of Celeste’s life, battling her own
guilt, battling her own desires to feel pain (both inside and outside
her body ), battling in the courts. As one commentator describes the
second series, it is telling a story about ‘the pervasive rot of masculinity,
aided by our justice system’ (Guy 2019), and this is played out through
multiple interfaces with law’s administrators, spaces and sounds.

The courtroom scene in which Celeste now must argue to retain her
children, in the face of Perry’s mother, who is attempting to take custody
or residency from Celeste is one such scene. It is a scene replete with the
agency of the women played out in definitive speech acts as they battle
each other before the law. Levelled in their resources – financial and
emotional, it seems. The arguments are a rhythmic exchange, a dance;
and the viewer witnesses what feels like a just result. The law understands
its own failings, supposedly. Celeste keeps her children, the pervasive
rot of masculinity seemingly limited by, not aided by, the justice system.
However, this win can be juxtaposed against the deliberate muting of
the group of friends, as they are interviewed individually by the police
after the death of Perry.
The muting is a device through which they can be at once viewed
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by the police on the other side of the mirrored glass. Through this
frame a speaker hisses a kind of white noise, the women tell a story,
with repetitive facial gestures, a story which we discover at the end of
the show, is fictitious. In this scene they are rendered liars. The female
detective, clicking her lighter back and forth, in a Sherlock Holmes
type gesture, knows the truth. She like, Bonnie, the only other major
black character, have a “special knowledge” about what is going on,
the classic ‘magical negro’ often portrayed in films dominated by white
characters (Glenn et al 2009). Bonnie sees Perry as suspicious when he
is looking for Celeste, she follows him, and it is Bonnie who effectively
kills him, pushing him down the stairs where he falls onto a spike that
punctures his throat. Killing him. Silencing him.

Silence is the ‘subtle melody’ in these scenes, as what Laub notes
as present in the narratives of all survivors. Silence as perhaps what we
place into it. The white noise, the clicking lighter enhancing the effect
of the women’s silence, and when the scene of Perry beating Celeste is
replayed, before he is pushed by Bonnie, there is a gentle piano melody
Agnes Obel’s September Song – and a hint of crashing waves in the
background that we can’t quite not hear. The police interviews become
a kind of parody of women’s treatment before the law. Liars. Silenced.
The series parodies their experience before the law, even where they
are culpable. ‘Why lie?’ the male detective asks, as if telling the truth
would result in justice. What the audience knows is precisely why they
lie, precisely why Perry was killed. What we have seen for the series
is the treatment of women: of Jane, of Celeste, of Madi, of Renata,
none of whom went to the police to look for justice. Now, in this silent
exploration of their faces we are all sympathy. Perry had to die. And
this reasonable act, rendered want we might call “proportionate force”
by the prior narrative – returns them as legal subjects.
Proportionality is as natural as the crashing waves, but it is not
always so clear, and proportionality is hard to narrate in the courtroom,
as a long history of arguments over provocation and self-defence when
women kill violent husbands in their sleep, reminds us (Tyson 2012).
This, then, is the melody carried on the crashing waves and rolling piano
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as the women are interviewed by the police, and the scene of Perry’s
death replayed. This is the subtle melody of law that cannot be drawn
out in the interviews, no matter the naturalness of proportionality
evoked by the killing of a violent husband, who, we are shown and
we are told, at least two women in the show thought would kill them.
Perry’s death does not end the violence of law’s misunderstanding of
women’s experience at the hands of violent men. This remains the
omnipotent, the unjudged.

Judgement would be to submit the perpetrator to the parameters
of reality and thus return the omnipotent perpetrator to the realm
of fantasy, leaving only the human who is subject to the laws of this
world. This is a reassertion of the hegemony of reality as reality. It is
this hegemonic reality which must confirm the contours of the victim/
survivor, allowing for her to moderate and mediate her own sensory
parameters. But in the realm of justice, such that it is, we cannot ask
that the perpetrator not speak, not grunt, not shuffle or indeed, not
to smell or even move the air in proximity to the sensory world of
the victim/survivor. That is, it is not the court’s role to protect the
victim/survivor from the experience of trauma that sound may induce.
Hence, we cannot ask the court to silence the perpetrator, but if we
take acoustic justice seriously, we cannot not put these issues before
judicial consideration.
The atmosphere of the courtroom, in Andreas PhillippopoulosMihalopoulos’ (2018) terms, is a location of justice in which the
spatiality of the courtroom – its choreography and geography – is also
one inhabited by sound. Parker and Ramshaw have both illuminated
these environments and their impacts, but I would add that the shuffles,
grunts, sighs, as well as the speech of the perpetrator, need to be part
of the considerations of justice as they pertain to the victim/survivor’s
experience. Without a consideration of the acoustics of justice then
we are pretending that the experience of pain, of violence or indeed of
trauma occurs in silence, knowing full well that it does not.
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Conclusion
Sound gets in. Sometimes involuntarily, sometimes without relief,
always with effects. The body cannot not wrap around sound, to process,
to understand, to signify, and, in psychoanalytic terms, to endeavour
mastery. When this sound appears as voice it always gestures to the
impossibility of mastery, the impossibility of knowing the world of
others and indeed of oneself completely. Such a knowing, at any level,
makes of voice a metonym for the experience of an identity without
fixed contours, and it promotes a desire for these contours. Law can
offer a substantiation of those contours, but at the same time it holds
them out in promise, a promise which is broken with every permeation
of the boundaries of flesh and feeling. We are not autonomous. Sound
tells us so.
When we experience sound, the effects can be pleasurable, but they
can also be excruciating in their resonance with a loss of autonomy
in experiences of interpersonal violence. Sound can permeate the
boundaries of flesh when we do not want it to. So too can people.
Law can speak to this permeation, when it is presented as a harm,
but spaces of justice are replete with soundscapes that can reproduce
the experience of a loss of autonomy through the very presence of the
perpetrator; the sounds that emanate from his (and sometimes her/their)
presence. Spaces of justice would struggle to contain these sounds, to
make them unhearable or unfelt, but, if we are to take acoustic justice
seriously, then the spaces of justice cannot not consider the permeating
effects of such an atmosphere on survivors; they cannot not think on the
soundscape that gets into the bodies of all, including the body of law.
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Endnotes
1. This is a common term in diagnostic manuals and in complex discussions of
the symptoms of trauma such as in Herman’s (2015) Trauma and Recovery:
The Aftermath of Violence – From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, Van der
Kolk’s (2014) The Body Keeps the Score: Brian, Mind and Body in the Healing
of Trauma and Luckhurst’s (2008) The Trauma Question.
2. In Lacanian terms this is not a re-trauma so much as a new trauma as it is
not only reflective of the experience of the assault but also a fragmentation
of her identity as a person who would be believed, respected, protected
by law.
3. She is referring to Danielle Tyson’s 2012 book Sex, Culpability, and the
Defence of Provocation. On speech acts of hatred, see Butler’s (1997)
Excitable Speech Psychology. On orality and sexuality in law generally
see Goodrich’s (1998) ‘The Laws of Love: Literature, History and the
Governance of Kissing’ in New York University Review of Law and Social
Change. I note my appreciation to Young for illuminating this field for me.

4. The woman’s body and the man’s body have differing capacities for
sovereignty in this sense. We know well, after many years of research and
experience, that the autonomy over the body of ‘woman’ and the body of
‘man’ are recognised legally and politically as very different relations, and
the recognition of authority over these borders is offered disparately. That
is, women are treated as porous and the boundaries of their bodies are not
easily recognised as their own to police or indeed to define. Porous borders
are not only the affliction of women, of course. They are the condition
of all those who are brutally subject to the invasive regimes of others,
including the state or to continue the sovereignty analogy, other states.

5. As we know well of Mill’s work ‘the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any members of a civilised community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill 1974).
6. As well as saliva, semen, urine etc (see Lacan 2006: 693).

7. For Lacan the subject exists always in a state of anticipated mastery from
the point at which it encounters the reality of representation, or the reality
that it is not all. He outlines this elaborately in the Ecrits in ‘The Mirror
Stage as Formative of the I Function’ (2006: 75-81).

8. Arguably this is why voice has been pronounced as so crucial for an ethics
of encounter in the form of an apology (Nicholas 1991).
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9. See Caruth 1996, Laub 1992, Van der Kolk et al 1995, Van der Kolk
2014, Herman 1992.

10. For a comprehensive list of these see the American Psychiatric Association’s
description of PTSD. For a more thorough articulation of these symptoms
in relation to experiences see the 2015 edition of Herman’s Trauma and
Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence- From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror.
Or, as Caruth states: ‘In its most general definition trauma describes an
overwhelming experience of sudden, or catastrophic events, in which
the response to the event occurs in the often delayed, and uncontrolled
repetitive occurrence of hallucinations and other intrusive phenomena’
(Caruth 1991: 181).

11. As Crowe notes ‘Changes have been implemented in the justice system
to minimize the emotionally violent impact on those testifying to sexual
assault. Remote witness facilities may be used and measures are in
place in the hope that the judge and criminal proceedings may be more
sensitive to the individual testifying to sexual assault’ (Crowe 2019:
407). Nevertheless, these measures are confined to the victim when s/
he testifies. To date I can find no documented precautions being taken
to protect the victim from hearing the perpetrator’s testimony, or other
aspects of their sonic presence, while she is in the courtroom.
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